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This thesis is written as a part of my specialization in International Business and Marketing 
being the final work in my Master of Science in Business Program at Nord University 
Business School. I am born and have lived in Nordland in most of my life, and as Nordland is 
the region with the highest production of farmed salmon in Norway, as a citizen of this region 
it has been interesting to follow this industry’s growth the latest years. Hence, it was a natural 
choice for me to study this particular industry and the global market for salmon in my thesis. 
During my Bachelor Degree, I was exchange student Seinan Gakuin in Japan, and personally 
experienced how important Norwegian seafood was in the daily food market in a country on 
the other side of the globe like Japan. In my Bachelor thesis I was studying the challenges 
Norwegian seafood producers meet in transporting their fresh seafood to European, Asian and 
American markets. I this study I decided to shift my attention to the structure of the global 
salmon market; the numbers of salmon suppliers their market positions, and what the 
competition between the different firms looks like. 
Before starting the work with the study, I discussed many possible angels to study with my 
supervisor, Professor Harald Bergland. He also gave me ideas for literature and data to read 
and study. I am grateful that he shared his knowledge with me. Thanks to my girlfriend for 
moral support. And finally, a very big thanks to my dad for solid advice and keeping me 
motivated! Any weaknesses in this thesis is my sole responsibility. 











In this study the focus is on the global salmon farming market. The purpose is to see into the 
structure of the salmon farming industry’s production structure regarding the number and size 
of the industry suppliers, in order to discuss the operating firms’ strategies. In particular, I 
focus on whether the salmon market works like an oligopoly rather than a market with strong 
competition, and try to reveal the strategies that the firms follow. I have dived my research 
problem into 2 different research questions: 
a. What does the global market for salmon look like, and what is actually the position of 
Norway as a salmon farming nation? 
b. What kind of strategies do the salmon farming firms follow, and what does this mean 
for the future of the salmon farming industry?  
 
Based on general market theory, industrial organization theory and strategy concepts 
presented in chapter 2, I shed light on these questions by looking into relevant secondary data 
from data aggregators like Norwegian Seafood Council and Statistics Norway, earlier 
empirical studies related to this industry and selected data from 3 different representing 
salmon farming firms’ official annual reports.  By confronting this data with market and 
industrial organization theory, I find  indications that the market competition in the salmon 
market can be understood as an oligopoly, either as a symmetric Cornout competition or as an 
asymmetric competition where some producers are dominant in setting prices in the market. 
The restrictions given by licenses, trade policies, environmental issues and policies, supply of 
necessary inputs (salmon feed), production technologies, and ecological and biological 
conditions means that the supply is increasing less than the global demand. This means that 
the industry is restricted when it comes to growth, and that each firm seeks to grow by 
merging others. Again, this means increased market power for the operating market actors. 
One of the few ways to increase its future production capacity for firm, is to compete for 
development licenses. Here firms are invited to come up with new and more efficient and 
environmental friendly production technologies that also means an increase in production. By 
studying 3 selected firms’ annual reports, the positioning for obtaining development licenses 
in order to gain an increase in production capacity, seems to be one of the most prominent and 
eye-catching single firm strategy, describing an industry that has reached its saturation point 
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The salmon aquaculture industry has developed a lot since the first farms started in the 1960s. 
How the competition between salmon farming firms is working now on the global market, I 
find as an interesting and fascinating problem to look into in my thesis. This is because of all 
the changes that recently have been made, possibly affecting how the salmon trade from the 
different producing firms and countries now is distributed and meets consumers’ needs and 
wishes around the world. The functioning of the salmon market and industry are also heavily 
influenced by different countries’ trade policy, environmental policies, and possibly the 
general and specific national policies towards taxes and production licences. Additionally, 
happenings like changes in international trade treaties and the ongoing pandemic situation 
could be affecting also the possibilities for conducting transport and trade of farmed salmon. 
Hence, studying the production and market for farmed salmon possibly involve many 
reasonable theoretical and empirical angels from the business and economic literature. This 
means that a concrete study one has to select some perspectives to follow, and just keep in 
mind others that could be followed and focused, possibly resulting in other interesting 
findings.  
 
How the global salmon market works, also affects Norway’s exports and hereby the total 
economy significantly. For instance, there are interesting points in recent history for Norway, 
like when China shut us out of their market after the “Peace Prize incident” in 2010, and when 
Russia closed its market to us and the European-Union after the “Crimea incident” in 2014. 
Also, recently Russia have barred imports of Norwegian salmon based on claims that the fish 
contains damaging chemicals (NRK Date 08.31.2020) 
 
The functioning of the world market for salmon, is also interesting to see connected to the 
overall growth of the industry as it has experienced, not only here in Norway, but 
internationally, during the last 30-40 years. Aquaculture as a whole, now encompasses the 
fastest growing meat-based food producing-sector in the world (Abate, et al., 2016; Marine 




1.1 Global aquaculture 
Salmon farming started in Norway in 1964, but did not really hit its stride until the 1980’s. In 
this decennium salmon production started an explosive growth, and the industry spread and 
took root in other counties, especially Scotland had a lot of early success (Ellis et al., 2016). It 
has been argued that the main reasons for the rapid growth of the salmon farming-industry in 
the successful countries are: 
1. The relative ease of cultivation aided by favourable climate-factors. 
2. Much aid and flexibility by the states in accommodating the industry. 
3. Lucky timing, with the growth of a cultural consumer-shift in favour of health-foods 
and the resulting status of salmon as a luxury-product. 
4. Good and versatile product attributes, like high fillet yield and the fact that it can be 
sold in many forms like; fresh, frozen, sushi or other readymade meals, which gives 
salmon a broad market appeal. 
(Ellis et al. 2016) 
 
1.2 Norwegian aquaculture 
Norway has helped spearheading this aquaculture-industry to its prominent position it holds 
today. Norway’s contribution comes in the form of its salmon farming-industry. It has grown 
to become the second biggest industry behind the petroleum-sector. In only a few years in the 
1980’s, the salmon farming-industry has increased its production from only a few thousand 
tons, to over 1,2 million tons in 2012 (Sandvold, 2016). 
 
All this is common knowledge and seams totally natural for us in Norway, but looking at the 
salmon farming-industry as a part of the aquaculture-industry, it sticks out. The biggest 
aquaculture-counties are by in large in East-Asia, with China in the lead, and the industry-
growth comes mostly from Africa.  There is reason to believe that success in aquaculture is 
linked to places with weak environmental legislation and impotent institutions and 
bureaucracies. Like most industries it grows with a country’s gross domestic product 
(Nadarajah & Flaaten, 2017). Europe is generally not big on aquaculture. Research indicates 
this might be connected with a generally unsuitable environmental legislation combined with 




1.3 The problem 
I intend to study how firms compete in the farmed-salmon-industry. In particular, it is 
interesting to see whether this market works more like some kind of oligopoly than a market 
with strong competition going on between the firms. Moreover, it is interesting to see what 
kind of specific strategies the firms have been following the recent years and how they 
actually are positioning themselves regarding the future. One may divide my research 
problem into 2 different research questions: 
a) What does the global market for salmon look like, and what is actually the position of 
Norway as a salmon farming nation? 
b) What kind of strategies do the salmon farming firms follow, and what does this mean 
for the future of the salmon farming industry?  
 
I intend to shed light on these questions by looking at earlier studies related to this industry.  
Additionally, specially related to question a) above, I will do my own empirical study, by 
analysing relevant secondary data from data aggregators like Norwegian Seafood Council and 
Statistics Norway. Particularly, confronting the data with market and industrial organization 
theory, I want to see whether the data shows indications on how the market competition in the 
salmon market fits standard oligopoly models. Related to research question b) above, I will 
conduct an empirical study of 3 different salmon farming firms’ official annual reports in 
order to reveal their ongoing and future strategies, and see this data in the light of the standard 
theory of business strategies. In conducting such a case study of a few salmon farming firms 
related to their strategies, we may find a clear picture of the farming industry’s way into the 
future. As far as I know, no one has conducted an analysis of the salmon farming industry in 
the way I intend to do, in particular the part related to business strategies. Hence, hopefully, 
the insights found in my research will add knowledge and possibly give ideas for further 
research. 
 
As I already mentioned in the first paragraph, the salmon aquaculture industry is affected by 
many factors and events, for instance trade policies, trade unions and treaties, environmental 
issues and policies, supply of necessary inputs (salmon feed), production technologies, 
ecological and biological conditions, and general and industry specific public regulations 
(taxes and licences). Whenever I find such factors and events necessary to shed light in my 
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descriptions and analyses, I have mentioned the actual events and relevant factors. However, 
conducting a complete analysis of all such factors’ influence on the salmon market. lies 
beyond the primary problem of this study.  
 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The further structure of the thesis follows a standard disposition. In section 2 I present 
relevant theory for analysing my problem and answering my two research questions. First, I 
describe and explain relevant concepts from the general market theory, industrial organization 
theory and strategy concepts that I will use when analysing the salmon industry and market as 
a whole, and the different salmon farming firms’ strategies. Secondly, I present the theory of 
an industry’s lifecycle that seems relevant to see the salmon farming industry in a long term 
development perspective.  
 
In section 3 I describe and discuss the way I have collected and used data in order to analyse 
the research questions. The empirical work is all based on secondary data that is publicly 
available, and the main challenge methodically has been to select relevant pieces of a really 
overwhelming open accessed information related to the aquaculture industry, present 
interesting aspects in a systematic way, and confront the empirical patters with relevant 
theory. Based on available secondary data and earlier empirical research literature, I present 
an overview of the industry in the first part of section 4. This means that I have chosen to 
place former empirical research literature together with the secondary data concerning the 
industry rather than in the theory chapter above. Secondly, in part 2 in section 4 I present 
some selected information from 3 salmon farming firms based on annual reports. 
 
Section 5 consists of my discussion on the research questions based on the theory and the data 
presented in section 2 and 4 respectively. In section 6 I sum up my main findings, remind 
myself and the readers of important limitations in my research, based on the choices I have 
made related to research questions, theory, methods and data. I have also included a paragraph 
where I come up with some ideas for further research on the status and development of the 





Studying the situation and development in the salmon farm industry could be conducted in 
many ways. Depending on what kind of aspects one is focusing on, many theoretical 
frameworks seem possible. For instance, if one limits the analysis to a national level, and 
consider all Norwegian sea farming firms as a whole, an interesting theoretical framework 
would be to focus on international trade opportunities and discuss trade policy issues like 
tariffs and other export barriers. (See for instance Chen and Garcia, 2016, and Sandersen and 
Malvik, 2015). Another interesting and up-to-date discussion going on, is how the Norwegian 
sea farming industrial actors should be taxed, see for instance NOU 2019:18, where optimal 
taxation policy related to welfare economic theory becomes a relevant framework. A third 
example on a relevant discussion going on, is the interaction sea farming and traditional fish 
harvesting have on each other, see for instance Bergland et al. (2019a), (2019b) and (2020). 
Compared to these examples, where the issues are specific and quite narrow and hence related 
to particular theoretical concepts, in my research I have chosen a broader and a rather 
explorative design, involving the market situation and strategies for a global industry that has 
developed a lot the recent years. Hence, in order to discuss and analyse the industry, I have 
chosen to use theoretical concepts from both market theory, industrial organization, and 
business strategies to add insight on how to describe and explain the market situation and the 
historical and future development of salmon farming markets.  
 
In the following I will first shortly focus on the demand side of the market and characterize 
some typical forces that bring understanding to the situation and development in the farmed 
salmon market (section 2.1). Second, I have looked into relevant theories of competitive 
strategy useful for understanding the firms possibilities and limitations (section 2.2). Third, I 
present the concept economies of scale related to the industry, both in production and in 
financial means (section 2.3).  Fourth, mergers and acquisitions, possibly seen as a 
consequence of economies of scale, are discussed (section 2.4). Fifth, I discuss the relevance 
of using market concentration measurements for analysing the industry (section 2.5.) Sixth, I 
introduce a market perspective where different oligopoly models are discussed. (section 2.6.). 
Seventy, I shortly comment on external factors and regulations directly impacting the market 
functioning (section 2.7). Finally, I bring in the long-term perspective on the industry’s 
lifecycle as a whole (section 2.8.)     
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2.1 Demand side factors 
Since the early days of salmon aquaculture farming the market has grown substantially. Now, 
farmed salmon is common food in stores and restaurants all over the world. With a steadily 
growing population the demand for food will increase, and the demand for farmed salmon 
will most reasonably also increase. With a focus on the heath issues, the popularity of sea 
food generally, farmed salmon might be even higher demanded in the future. One way of 
characterizing the short and long term demand in a market, is related to the demand function 
in consumer theory, where the actual number demand is dependent on the price of the 
product, prices of complementary and substitutable products and the consumers’ disposable 
income. (Riis & Moen 2013) In my context, analysing the actual market for farmed salmon, I 
will discuss the price elasticity conditions, measuring how sensible the demand is for 
marginal changes in the salmon price. Moreover, the income (Engel-) elasticity is measuring 
the sensibility on demand when the average income is changing, and cross price elasticities 
are measuring the marginal effect in demand as prices on other products are changing.    
  
2.2 Strategy 
Turning to the suppliers it is reasonable to assess how they should strategically face the 
market conditions. Strategy is a broad term with too many definitions to mention enough of 
them to give a meaningful understanding about its utilization in all the deferent literature. I 
will discuss strategy as the legal way a firm can obtain a sustainable competitive advantage or 
secure a sustainable market share for a product. This is an adequate description for the 
industry a will be investigating in my thesis. 
 
Basic viable strategies for any market can be summarised as; 1 - product differentiation, 
creating a product of superior quality, resulting in being able to charge a premium per unit 
produced, not available to other competing firms. 2 – niche marketing, creating a product 
tailored specifically to a market segment to whom this is highly valued, again securing a 
premium charge. 3 – Cost leadership, producing the product at lower cost than the 
competition allowing either selling the product at a higher profit or pushing out competitors 
from the market, because of your cost advantage allows you to sell at lower prices without 
losing money. (Johnson et al. 2017) 
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Now, looking at these strategies, what good strategies remain when the product in question is 
a very homogenise product. As the ability to change the product is limited and therefore not 
lightly to be highly valued, the obvious choice ends up being strategy 3. If all firms have a 
reasonable similar technological production-process, value generation per unit input-factor, 
there is likely to be competition for control of input-factors and other strategic resources. I 
will come back to this in the section on mergers and acquisitions. There is a way of doing a 
kind of niche-marketing also, if one manages to service a market segment for some reason 
neglected by others. In this form of niche-marketing the exceptional part of the product is not 
an alteration to the product itself, but the fact that it is available in an otherwise neglected 
market.  
 
2.3 Economies of Scale 
The most important concept to understand when discussing cost leadership is economies of 
scale. A firm’s average costs might decline-, or -returns might increase, relative to the 
production-scale. There are many situations that might give this result. If fixed costs, for 
example, do not vary much with production quantity, they will reduce per product unit, 
resulting in a lower cost per unit produced. Another factor pushing for Economies of scale is 
the fact that, is allows a higher specialization of the workforce. This means that either each 
worker can increase the out-put or the quality of their work as their attention is spread on a 
narrower range of work activities. As long as any of these effects cost-benefits of expanding 
production is greater than any potential drawbacks, like a additional management cost related 
to having a larger company organization, there is a clear cost-benefit to the larger firm in an 
industry. (Carlton & Perloff 2015) 
 
With a larger firm comes a more financial tools, and a “bigger wallet”. This allows bigger 
firms to handle volatilities in the market better than smaller firms might. A larger firm might 
even capitalize on situations where there are big shifts. If for example, if prices where to 
suddenly drop. Some smaller firms might find themselves in immediate liability trouble. 
Especially if a large amount of the firm’s value is invested in current production runs, which’s 
value is tied to the current market price of the finished product. This sort of situation might 
lore bigger firms to acquire smaller firms as they can be “bought at a discount” or below the 
opportunity cost. This effect is increased with the length of the production cycle and the 
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relative investment in that product in production, as this gives time for the price to revert; and 
long-term investments like; infrastructure, production-facilities, patents, licenses and so on. 
 
2.4 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Merges and acquisitions can be divided into three main types or forms; 1, vertical mergers (A 
firm combining with its supplier), 2, Horizontal mergers (Firms competing within the same 
markets combine) and 3, conglomerate mergers (Firms in unrelated lines of businesses 
combine). I will be talking about type 1 and 2 from here on, as they are most relevant, in 
looking at firms in a single industry. (See for instance Carlton & Perloff 2015 or Lipczynski 
et al. 2005). The push for mergers within an industry is usually quite simply explained as 
increasing profits through economies of scale and increasing efficiency through synergies 
between the combined firms.  The result is also a bigger entity, with the combined resources 
and capabilities of both. It also reduces the number of market actors by 1 and leaves the 
market more concentrated afterwards.  
 
Vertical integration is a point of special interest so I will elaborate a little on it. Firstly, it is a 
way to lower transactional costs. But it does also ensure the supply of a vital resource, and 
can in part control the production and transaction of this resource. So, in addition to defending 
the firm it can give the firm greater market power. It is now also able to tailor the input-factor 
especially to its unique needs. It also eliminates possible ill effects relying on multiple 
different suppliers with different standard might have on the production process (Carlton & 
Perloff 2015). 
 
Alichian and Allen in Asche et. al. (2019) hypothesized that higher quality wares will be 
shipped a longer distance, as logistics related costs will be a smaller, compared to percentage 
of revenue of the goods sold. We can also see that companies in china will upgrade the quality 
of their products for further markets. They will also increase prices in these markets. Feenstra 
and Romalis in the same work, argue that average quality and price might be lower due to the 
larger markets attracting a larger number of actors, in order to service that bigger market. 
Manny actors also forces these actors to deliver more heterogeneous products. Auer, Chaney 
and Saure, in the work I referred above, also show that prices dependents on the wealth level 
of the market in the country exported to. In short, the smaller the market and the higher the 
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wealth-level, the more pricy and higher quality can be expected from goods in any given 
market, and vice versa.  
 
2.5 Market concentration 
Industry concentration is one key indicator of the overall market structure. This is usually a 
measured as function of the total market share of the most dominant firms, or all the firms on 
the market. When looking at how concentrated the market is by analysing the biggest market 
actors there are two generally accepted standards the C4 and the C8 standards. The C4 is the 
total market-share of the four biggest and C8 is a summation of the 8 largest. The most 
popular measurement for market concentration which considers the entire market is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the squared sums of every 
market actors market-share and is considered to be a good standard to when investigating 
markets behaving in accordance with the Cournot model (Lipczynski et al. 2005).  
 
2.6 Different market forms 
A simplified way of looking at the possible market forms is represented in the figure 2.1 
below. In general market power is centralized in the same directions to the arrows indicating 
the number of market actors operating in the given market. And this effect is mirrored as 
market actors decrease along the edges from green corner. So, following the blue supplier-
count arrow up from the yellow, negotiation market corner, market power is shifting to the 
demander, as more suppliers appear in the market, having to compete in order to sell their 
products to the individual demander. This ends in the blue corner, monopsony. And we can 
see the inverse effect if we follow a line from the green, perfect competition-, or free market 
model-corner. Where market power is increasingly focused in the hands of ever fewer 





Figure 2.1: Conceptual market model 
 
 
Of cause, in reality, market power is a more complex topic than the relative numbers of 
suppliers and demanders. Where questions regarding abnormally high profit-margins, due to 
prices being more closely in accordance with marginal revenue; instead of what is socially 
efficient, marginal cost. I will explain in chapter 3, but I will not be examining the cost-
structure or the demand elasticity for single firms (good ways of analysing market power), 
and therefor will not discuss those aspects further in my thesis. 
 
I want to focus on the bottom right, red square, which is the domain of the monopoly, duopoly 
and, even though I did not write it there, oligopoly models. These are also the market forms 
more likely to form cartels and other unscrupulous practices. The reason for this is simple, 
there are fewer firms, so they have an easier time acting coordinated. And as there are few 
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choices for customers it might be hard to switch, and to even notice, if they are targeted with 
such practices. 
 
There are many different types of oligopolies and they operate in different ways. However, 
there are some standard commonalities for oligopolies; 1 – consumers are price takers. 2 – the 
products produced in the markets are homogeneous, customers do not have strong preferences 
between the firms. 3 – New firms do no not enter the market. 4 – The firms collectively have 
market-power resulting in a price above marginal cost. 5 – Each firm competes on price or 
output. Advertising and other marketing do not play a major role (Carlton & Perloff 2015). 
 
One interesting aspect concerning oligopoly theory, is the strategies coming up when focusing 
on Research and Development (R&D) opportunities. (See for instance Sørgard 2013). One 
finding from this literature is that it is easier to finance R&D for a big production actor with a 
strong financial position. Such a firm is more capable of funding the R&D investments and is 
more likely to gain potential large profits from the investment. 
 
The Cournot model describes a market where two or more actors compete in a simultaneous 
game, in which the actors decide their quantities, being aware of the possible reaction from 
their opponents. This is a model where each individual actor has more market-power than in a 
price-setting models like Bertrand. Hence, acting as Cournot-competitors is advantageous to 
both firms compared to a price-competitive situation (Bertrand-competition).   (Riis & Moen 
2013) 
 
Another oligopoly model often presented in industrial organisation is based on asymmetry 
between the competitors. If one actor is able to decide the quantity first, and the other has to 
take this quantity as given, we have a Stackelberg-situation. Another oligopoly model is 
characterized by a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. This describes a market where 
firms compete on price. In this model one firm operates with a competitive cost-advantage. 
This makes them the dominate firm. The dominate firm is therefore privileged with price-
setting, leaving the residual market actors to be price-takes. It is also possible for a group of 
firms to act in concert in order to mimic a dominate firm for a market. This is a form of cartel 
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behaviour. If this market is to function, there are some fundamental principles that must be 
fulfilled, for instance high barriers to entry. The dominate group of firms must know the 
market demand curve and anticipate the output from the fringe-firms for any price-point. 
These final two are prerequisites for the dominant firm to optimise its production-output 
(Lipczynski et al. 2005). 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a good place to start in understanding how cartels work, and the 
governing rationale of the actors involved. The game-matrix below, in figure 2.3, is an 
example of a game where two actors are to make a choice regarding cutting or holing prices 
where they are in a simultaneous game. Both our players; Mr. Orange and Mr. Blue, know the 
possible outcomes of the game from the matrix. The ideal outcome for both parties is to cut 
prices, and for the opponent to hold. Then the person who was alone in cutting the price will 
get a profit of 700. The person held will only get 100. Nash found that neither player will 
choose to hold prices in such situations. The dominant strategy is to cut prices, and both 
parties will end with a profit of 300, the solution in red. This is predicated on the matrix being 
the sum-total of the information/communication the two firms have of each other. Even 
though both parties know there is a natural compromise in both holding their prices, leaving 
both players better off, 300<500. There is no reason to believe the opponent is not hoping to 
end up with the 700-return, and is content avoiding ending up with only 100. Knowing 
exactly what the opponent is considering, in effect forces both parties to cut prices to avoid 
losing 200 in profit (100 - 300 = - 200) and the competitor ending up with an advantage of 
600. 
 
This all changes if Mr Orange and Mr. Bule have the ability to communicate. Then they might 
just be able to agree to the blue solution, 500 each where both parties hold prices high. Both 
parties have an incentive of 200 additional profit to find this solution (500 - 300 = 200) and 
the industry, as a whole prospers better here too. However, they also both have the incentive 
to cheat, and to lure the other player to hold prices whilst they cut. The result is that they will 
only work together like a cartel to hold prices high if each side poses a legitimate threat to the 
other, in order to disincentivise one player of suddenly cheating. The threat might be in the 




Figure 2.2: The cartel game as a Prisinor’s dilemma 
 
(Figure Johnson et al. 2017, page 228) 
This is about the simplest rational for a cartel. Of course, there are more complex cartels in 
the real world but the fundamentals come out well from this simple game. The individual 
company is secure from hard competition from industry-peers as long as everyone is in on the 
game. And the industry as a whole earns higher profits from organising in this way. Finally, 
as the cartel sets higher prices, the customers lose from such market-solutions, and they lose 
more than the firms win (see for instance Riis & Moen 2013). 
 
2.7 Other factors and regulations directly impacting the market functioning 
So far, we have looked on aspects concerning demand and supply in a market, and possible 
actions from the individual firms and demanders participating in the market. As we have 
commented on before, this industrial market for salmon is regulated in several ways. The 
recent years the Norwegian authorities have introduced auctions for production-licenses for 
the farming of salmon to the individual firms in the business. This is in order to control the 
scale and locations chosen for farming. For a couple of years since, also development licenses 
where introduced, in order to stimulate technological innovations in the industry. For all these 
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licenses the firms are competing in auctions to win rights to grow and develop. The 
authorities choice of using auction principles and competitive grant proposals in distributing 
both ordinary licences and development licenses affect the firms’ strategies. As seen in the 
general literature in microeconomics, the purpose of auctions and competitive applications for 
production licenses is to secure that the most efficient firms obtain the right to grow, see for 
instance Riis & Moen (2013).     
 
For general trade theory we know that both direct and indirect trade barriers affect the prices 
and quantities of product being exported and imported between nations. Moreover, trade 
treaties or lack there of also influence how trade patterns become and develop. As farmed 
salmon is produced both in Norway and in several foreign countries, and the firms might be 
multi-national controlled and owned, trade policy issues are important to understand how the 
market function (see for instance Krugman et al. 2018)  
 
2.8 Industry lifecycle  
In investigating any industry, especially when looking at it with a certain historical context it 
might be reasonable to take into account the industry lifecycle, see for example Johnson et al. 
(2017). This gives a certain perspective, enabling us to make assumptions regarding the likely 
market structure and the challenges typical for a particular stage in the lifecycle. The lifecycle 
is divided into 5 distinct phases; 1 – Development, an experimental period, few actors with 
little rivalry between them and low barriers to entry. 2 – Growth, market expansion, moderate 
to low rivalry as new firms enter the marketplace seeing the success of their peers. As firms 
grow into the marketplace, access to key resources and suppliers become a focus, in order to 
capture new market shares. But barriers to entry might still be low, as companies have yet to 
establish big advantages derived from long experience, large scale production and loyal 
customers. 3 – Shake-out, signified by a market saturation, and a sowing in the market 
growth. As the opportunities for grabbing new market-shares dries up, direct interaction and 
competition results in a volatile market and irregular profits. Increased rivalry forces the 
weaker firms out of business, leaving the more dominant firms. 4 – Maturity, barriers to entry 
starts increase and economics of scale and experience start becoming key success-factors. 
High market share becomes more important as it gives leverage in negotiations and a cost 
advantage. 5 – Decline, this is the terminal stage for an industry, and it starts becoming when 
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the business model is unviable. I will not discuss this phase any longer, as I think it is not 
applicable to the focus-industry of this thesis. People are unlikely to stop eating salmon any 
time soon.  
Figure 2.3: Industry lifecycle 
 
(Figure from Johnson et al. 2017, page 79) 
There is however an alternative 5’th stage. Reinvigoration, where the industry goes into a new 
growth-spurt. This can be achieved if the limiting factors for increasing the industry market-
share, as a whole, can be overcome. This might, for example, be as a result of technological 
innovation or finding new applications for the product. This can last until the new market is 












In this section I will explain how I have worked to answer my research questions. The first 
question a) is related to how the global market for salmon look like, and what is actually the 
position of Norway as a salmon farming nation. Mostly, this question is answered by looking 
into secondary data available from data aggregators and published scientific research. The 
second question b), focusing on what kind of strategies the salmon farming firms follow and 
the consequences for the future of the salmon farming industry, is explored by adding the 
information from studying annual reports from selected firm. In section 3.1 I will give a short 
overview concerning data acquisition, followed by a description how I chose the data sources 
in section 3.2. Section 3.3 contains a presentation of the way I analyzed the data, and finally 
in section 3.4 I discuss strengths and weaknesses of the methods used. For details regarding 
relevant methodology to the research problem I have looked at in my thesis, I have based my 
approach on the work by Jacobsen (2013).  
 
3.1 Data acquisition 
My first step was searching the university Oria search engine to have a look at all the latest 
research on salmon farming and aquaculture. After sifting through a load of studies I got a 
general idea of what the hot button issues within the industry are, and generally where the 
scientific consensus is. I also got a more, and more refined interests within the industry. The 
salmon-farming industry has vast literary and still growing research-bibliography and 
naturally it is largely centred in Norway. There is an abundance of great in-depth research 
examining almost any aspect of the industry. In addition, there are several great data 
aggregators like Norwegian statistics and the department of fishing, continuously publishing 
great static data and reports on the industry.  
 
The salmon-farming industry is a very big industry and it would be very expensive and work-
intensive to collect independent data of the sort these aggregators provide. And collecting 
independent data on specific firms will be even more difficult, as I would have to be granted 
access. In reality, there is no realistic way for me as a master student to collect such a diverse 
and comprehensive data of production- and export-metrics. When is comes to looking at the 
strategic choices, of the firms I decided to look at closer I could have requested interviews in 
order, not to rely on the sanitised presentations presentation in their annual reports, and get a 
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more unfiltered perspective of their views on competition within the industry. However, it is 
hard to get such access and thinking they will be willing to share such sensitive secrets with 
me is a little naïve. Even though annual reports are made to resemble marketing the 
information they contain regarding the company in question is accurate and they must be by 
law. 
 
Fortunately for me there exists such an overwhelming wealth of data and established research. 
And that made the decision to choose to rely on this published data natural for me when 
looking at the research questions I was looking into. I will go through in detail the strengths 
and weaknesses of my methods in section 3.4. Although the there is an abundant wealth of 
both research, data, industry reports and reports from individual firms, these are all, by in 
large, quite narrow in the scope of what they are trying to examine within the industry. There 
is little published materiel out there, that try to congregate the conclusions from these 
different studies in established market-economic or industrial organizational theoretical-
frameworks in order to try to gleam insights of the kind I am attempting in this thesis.  
 
3.2 How I selected the secondary sources  
When it comes to how I selected my secondary sources, I went to the most authoritative 
sources I could find. Scientifically published research was my first stop to find good reliable 
data. I saw in many of these studies, that they used Norwegian statistics (SSB), the Fishing 
directory (Fiskedirektoratet) and the Norwegian Seafood Council so I had a look at what these 
institutions had published in regards relevant data I could use in my research. Then I picked 
some large firms to look at more closely. I picked firms listed on the Oslo stock exchange, 
just so they would all be tied to the same economic market, but that seemed to be different 
from each other. The thought was that by examining different firms I could perhaps see 
different strategies in action, and by reading their different assessments of how things were 
going in the industry I might get a broader perspective. Lastly as I read industry news, I refer 
to some news articles in this thesis. These flesh out the competitive environment, and 




3.3 How I analysed the empirical data 
Firstly, I use the published scientific material to describe and explain the historical 
development of the aquaculture industry on the national level, where Norway’s position is 
particularly focused. In order to complete and update the material earlier published, I have 
used the latest salmon farming industry data available from the sources mentioned in section 
3.1. As far as I understand the former research, there is general scientific consensus 
concerning how and why the industry has developed the way it has. 
 
Secondly, I will look in depth at concentration measurements both historically but more 
interestingly, what at looks like right now. Here I will use the Herfindahl index in addition to 
other simpler standard measurements like C4. All empirical measurements have strengths and 
weaknesses. For a complete discussion of strengths and weaknesses see (industrial 
organishon). The most relevant weakness for my study of the competitive environment is the 
fact that I do not look at the specific effect of varying the production-quantity of large firms in 
order to ascertain the price-effects. However, as I see it, related to the salmon market, 
production capacities and production time lags mean that the firm quantities are less flexible 
related to product prices than ordinary markets commented on in general textbooks in 
industrial organization. 
 
Thirdly, after presenting the representative statements from the annual reports from the 
selected salmon farming firms, I compare key points in order to ascertain the strategies 
utilized in order to compete in the market. I have decided to not go into all the accounting 
data and profitability ratios, which could have given insights into costs and incomes. I have 
done this, in order to highlight the bigger strategic moves which indicate the strategic 
positioning of the firms, and how they might try to gain an advantage going forwards. In 
particular I have chosen to focus on development licenses that are the cutting edge in growth-
opportunities for the industry as a whole and the individual companies in Norway today.   
 
3.4 Strengths and weknesses in my methods 
The weaknesses of not gathering any data personally is that it is not tailored to my research. I 
had to be very aware what sources to utilize and to be conscious of the reason the data is 
available and the presentation of it. This is especially true when utilizing data published by 
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market actors in the industry, like the yearly reports and accompanying statistics from firms in 
the industry and when referring to news sources.  
 
There is also the problem that my data is not all published at the same time, there is the 
distinct possibility that assumptions taken for granted in some research will have changed in 
some later research making combining the concussions in order to fit a theoretical model 
fully.  
 
The overwhelming amount of scientific research regarding the economic issues relating to the 
modern aquaculture and the enormous data resources openly available mean that I have had to 
make certain decisions regarding what to include in this research. This means I could never 
encompass the entire industry and all relevant factors. I only hope and think I have included 

















In this chapter I will present some of the most relevant data I have been studying. First, in 
section 4.1 I present the salmon farming industry through scientific literature in a historical 
context, complemented by some up to date data from open sources, where appropriate. In the 
next section 4.2 I will utilize well established concentration measurements in order to give 
insights for further elaborations, in chapter 5, regarding the competitive situation within the 
salmon farming industry. In the following section 4.3 I will present my chosen firms in order 
to evaluate what competitive strategies they are following. Finally, in section 4.4 I will 
present an overview of development licences for further discussion in the next chapter 5.  
 
4.1 Salmon farming nations 
There is a limit on the suitable coastal areas for salmon farming. The suable places are 
depicted on the map below. These are all located within certain latitudes in the Northern and 
Southern Hemispheres. It is imperative that the fish is kept at the right temperature, 0-20 
degrees Celsius and if possible 8-14 degrees. They also require good waterflow through their 
enclosure, but not so much, that it impedes movement. Lastly there are certain biological 
necessities for the area for a productive and successful salmon farm. As these requirements 
are quite particular and with the regulations connected with the industry, the farmable areas 
are in the fjords and other protected costal locals, and rules out much of the coastline.   
 
The salmon farming-industry does not seem to follow the tendency of aquaculture in general. 
Salmon farming is dominated by mainly western countries; the United States, Norway, 
Scotland and the Faroe Islands, but Chile is also among the biggest producers of artic salmon 






Figure 4.1 Locations of salmon farms world wide 
 
(Figure: MOWI annual report 2019 Date 08.31.2020) 
 
Figure 4.2 Salmon market shares per nation 




As one can gleam from the picture above, the distribution-side of the farmed-salmon market 
seems quite narrow. Especially, given the fact we find artic salmon in stores and restaurants 
almost world-wide. Although there are several environmental, technical and recourse 
requirements restricting the proliferation of salmon farming, there is lacking research 
explaining how the industry has ended up dominated by so few and by mainly rather small 
countries, supplying the world-market (Marine Biology, 2017).  
Chile 
Though the salmon farming-industry has seen a lot of quick growth, it has also experienced 
collapses in the industry of entire nations. The most recent dramatic example of this 
phenomena was in Chile. Where the salmon farming-industry quickly grew from 135.000 tons 
with an estimated value of 538 million US-dollars in 1996 to 397.000 tons in 2007 valued at 
an estimated 2.241 billion US-dollars, making the industry one of the biggest in Chile. At the 
time Chilean-salmon had captured around 40% of the world market, with especially 
dominating market shares in the US and Japan. When ISA (infectious salmon anaemia) 
showed up in Chile in 2007 it almost killed the entire industry, resulting in a loss on 360 tons 
in biomass. This crippled the industry for a long time, and was worsened when it coincided 
with the financial crisis (Bravo et al. 2013).  
 
Figure 4.3 Chilean production – costs and export prices 
 





There was a similar event in Scotland starting in the late 80s when there was a shortage of 
smolt followed by plagues of aeromonas salmonicida and later ISA, throughout the 90s, 
leaving the industry much worse for wear. (Ellis et al. 2016). This frightened local investors 
and paved the way for the big investments by the large Norwegian firms to expand their 
operations in Scotland. 
 
The industry has recovered and grown in line with other salmon-farming-countries in 
Scotland, however legislation in Scotland have been particularly harsh. So even though laws 
and regulations have been stable and foreseeable a number of NGO’s (some made up of 
hobby fishers) have caused costs to be at a higher level than in, for example Norway, 
lowering efficiency and limiting the benefits of economies of scale (See for example MOWI 
annual report 2019). Scottish officials have however, stated their goal of increasing 
production output by 170 000 tons. At the moment, the biggest concern for the market in 
Scotland is Brexit, and what possible implications this will have on toll and/or tariffs, 
especially for the European market.  
 
Faroe Islands  
Figure 4.4 Faroe Islands production – costs, and export prices 
 




The Faroe Islands has an interesting history and very unlike the major disasters Chile and 
Scotland. Naturally being islands in the North Sea, the industry is naturally suited for the 
region. The Faroe Islands also has other less obvious natural advantages. The Faroe Islands 
are an independent region under the Danish kingdom, but outside the European Union. 
(Bakkafrost annual report 2019). This is sort of a complicated arrangement, but it has put The 
Faroe Islands in a unique position. The definitive market leader of salmon farming in the 
Faroe Islands is Bakkafrost. After they acquired Havsbrun in 2012, they ended up too big for 
the country antitrust laws (owing 50% or more of the salmon licenses in the «country» is 
illegal). This forced them to sell down to 49%. As we can see in the Figure 4.4 above, the 
industry has seen a great amount of growth. However, the coastline is now pretty much at 
capacity, leaving little room for domestic expansion. The Faroe Islands has also had a special 
position after Russia invaded Crimea in 2014. In the aftermath of the invasion/annexation, 
Russia, in response to international sanctions and condemnation, instituted a ban on importing 
food from the US, the EU, Canada, Australia and Norway. Meaning that, among salmon-
farmers, firms with a location on the Faroe Islands got much less competition for the Russian 
market, something they capitalised on heavily. This is also reflected in the export price 
increase in 2014 and thereafter. 
Norway as a salmon farming country 
Figure 4.5 Norwegian production – aquaculture quantities and value 
 
(Figure from: NOU, 2019) 
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The aquaculture industry in Norway as a whole, is quite well represented by the graph above. 
As we can plainly see, the industry is dominated by artic salmon. And that apart form a 
marginal rainbow trout production, the rest of the production is insignificant and mostly for 
experimental purposes.  The industry has also obviously grown a lot, both in regards to the 
biomass, and the value. Although both value and biomass has been increasing, the 
relationship is not perfectly corelated. From this we can conclude that there must be other 
major value-factors, driving the growth seen in the aquaculture industry. 
Investment 
Figure 4.6 Norwegian investment history in aquaculture 
Another interesting dynamic we can see in 
the Norwegian aquaculture-story is 
responsiveness of investment in the 
industry. If we look at the green value-line 
in the Figure 4.5 above, we can see it 
spikes shapely four times after the industry 
kind of “really started” in the mid-to-late 
80’s; the first time is around time is around 
2000 then again, around 2006, then 2010, 
and finally 2017, and it has yet to fall 
again.  
 
(Figure from: NOU, 2019) 
Correlating these dates with the investment-history in aquaculture we can see how the 
industry has grown over the years. There is another dimension look at the growth seen in the 
industry, the stock market. 
 
Seafood index, OSLSFX 
Looking at the relative performance of the seafood index on Oslo Børs (OSLSFX, on the 
graph) the index has recently been severely outperforming not only the OSEBX, but all the 
other industry indexes represented on the graph for reference.  As represented on the left, we 
see the OSLSFX really seems to start relatively overperforming the market as a whole, in 
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2015. And as we saw on the investment graph above this also coincides with the latest round 
of investments in the industry.  
 
Figure 4.7 Seafood index, OSLSFX 
This probably both incentivised active 
aquaculture-firms to invest in expanding their 
operations and actors on the financial market 
to seek exploits in the industry. As final note 
on the explosive growth in the OSLSFX 
index, it is important to remember that only 
the biggest companies on the market is 
accounted for when indexing the seafood 
index. There is another facet to this story, 
further explained in the chapter 4.2 “market 
concentration” that might also be a causal 
factor to the dramatic upticks in recent years. 
(Figure from: NOU, 2019) 
 
Looking at other possible major factors for the ostensive growth spurts the salmon farming 
industry saw in 2000, around 2006, then again in 2010, and finally 2017 should also be seen 
in conjuncture with the price.  
 
Looking at the historic salmon price-distribution as a random walk makes it difficult to 
explain industry-growth in the later years. Segmenting the data into periods from 1995-2000 
we can see that salmon-prices are quite high with relatively low variance. In the late 1990’s 
the price rises towards 2000 where the clear spike. This price-increase was accompanied with 
stable increase in production-quantity. After 2000 prices went down, that probably 
contributed to production reductions in the next few years and production did not recoup until 
around 2005-2006. If we crop the data and look at export-prices from that time until the 




Figure 4.8 Weekly Price of Salmon Exports 2000-2020 
 
Source: Norway Statistics, SSB (Numbers updated 22.01.2020) 
Figure 4.9 Production – costs, and export prices 
 
(Figure from: NOU, 2019) 
Now there are good reasons not to eliminate half of the data to make it fit a different conclusion. 
But in this case, I would argue there are good reasons to analyse the post-2005-data independent 
to the previous years. Just by looking at the graph we can clearly see that there are much more 
dramatic price-fluctuations in recent years. This increase in variance, combined with the 
explosive growth in the volumes produced, which had started to stagnate in the early 2000’s, 
indicate that there where fundamental changes in the market. In a rapidly changing market, it 
is natural to see faster dramatic changes in prices as business-actors try to keep up and exploit 
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Salmon is product vulnerable to spoilage, therefore it cannot be stored, and marketed fresh. It 
also has a rather long production cycle of 3 years. This results in production quantities that are 
very difficult and expensive to adjust on short notice in order to react to changes in the 
demand. This is the one of the main reasons for price-volatility on the market.  
 
Historically the Scottish salmon has traded above the price of Norwegian Salmon, and salmon 
from the Faroese Islands slightly below. However due to the changes in trade-policies in 
regards to Norway in recent years this has changed, and reversed itself for certain markets. 
 
Table 4.1 Rellative yeary supply and price changes  
Looking at the salmon market we can see that the 
global supply growth was steady and mostly high 
from 2000 until 2013. As we can se from the 
table, this changes after 2013, and the total 
production drops off. We can also clearly see the 
impact of changing the supply growth has on the 
price. According to the linear regression done by 
Mowi annual report 2019, changes in the supply 
increase explain 84% of the price changes in the 
same period. In the period depicted the total 
global supply increase was 198%. We can also see 
that in recent years after 2013, when the supply 
growth is lower, the annual; relative, average, 
price changes are much smaller, just as expected 
if the supply, or supply growth rates are main 
factor in determining market price.  
 




The general trend might be even easier to see in the graph below. Where the observations are 
clustered around the 6-7 %. And we can see the 2019 observation, indicated there, right in the 
middle of the cluster. The outliers, are mostly from earlier years, like 2013, as indicated, when 
supply growth swings were more drastic.  
 
Figure 4.10 Price and Supply scatterplot with regessoinline 
(Figure from: Mowi 2019 Annual report) 
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4 .2 Market concentration 
Figure 4.11 Number of firms for 80% of supply 
 
(Figure from: Mowi 2019 Annual report) 
The graph above represents the most important salmon farming countries in the world, and 
the number of firms responsible for 80% of the market production. As we can see there is a 
big drop-off in the most important markets. In Norway we can se the most drastic change 
from around 70 firms to under 20. There are also notable drops in Chile, where it is more than 
halved from ca. 35 to 13, in Scotland from 10 to 4 and North America where their market is 
mostly 2 firms.  
 
There is, in short, a general trend for how all these national salmon markets have developed. 
The last two decades the industry has seen a lot of consolidation in every region where there 
is salmon production. There is also reasons to think this trend will continue (see chapter 5-6). 
At the moment there are approximately 120 firms who own standard commercial licences 
entitling them to farm salmon and trout in Norway. All the mergers and acquisitions’ do 
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however mean that the total production is controlled by a total of 90 companies, as the 
remaining, license owning firms are owned by other market actors. 
 
This sort of centralisation is reflected in the Chilean market also, where there are 
approximately 1360 licences for the farming of salmon, trout and coho. In Chile 90% of the 
countries total production comes from the top 13 aquaculture firms in the nation. And the 10 
larges firms account for 83% of the total industrial aquaculture licenses. 
 
This does not take into account to what degree the same firms are represented in multiple 
markets in these top firms responsible for the bulk of the product in the market. To get some 
further insight into how broadly the top firms are represented we can look at the Table 4.2 
below. 
Table 4.2 Top suppliers in the biggest salmon farming countries 
 
(Table from: Mowi 2019 Annual report) 
Looking at this table there are a few names that jump out at us. Mowi first of all; first, the 
biggest producer in two of the four big markets listed; in Norway and the United Kingdoms. 
And second largest in North America, only the Cooke mega conglomerate’s aquaculture firm 
is larger in their home market. And Mowi comes in at number 4 in Chile. In general, we can 
see that the big Norwegian firms are represented in all the markets. Notable non-Norwegian 
firms are; Cooke, the North-American giant, New Aquachile, the Chilean giant and 
Bakkafrost, the biggest salmon farmer on the Faroe Islands who bought their way into the 
Scottish market in recent years. Even though these are all important firms on the world stage. 
There is no way around the fact that the global market is pretty much dominated and owned 
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by the Norwegians. This fact is only compounded when looking into the other, nationally big 
suppliers, for example Scottish Sea Farms, the third biggest producer in the United Kingdoms. 
It is owned and controlled by Lerøy Seafood and Salmar, the number two and three biggest 
suppliers in Norway. This is very commonplace as there as been so much buyouts in the 
industry, something I will discuss more in depth in the next chapter (chapter 5).  
 
In order not to run into the problem of counting these companies; who can not reasonably be 
counted as independent market actors, as they might not compete against their owners, I will 
use Norway as a microcosm of the industry as a whole, when calculating market 
concentration, the C4 and C8. The Norwegian market and the firms there are a reasonable 
representation of the world market. 
 
The 8 biggest salmon farmers in Norway and their approximate market shares are as follows; 
Mowi 19,74%, Salmar 12,76, Lerøy 10,72%, Cermaq 6%, Grieg Seafood 4,8%, Nova 3,8%, 
Nordlaks 2,9%, Sinkberg-Hansen 2,5%. This gives us the following concentration 
measurements; C4 = 49,22, C8 = 63,22. It is also worth noting that is around 20% of the 
market alone, this id also true if looked at as a percentage of the total world supply.   
Export markets   
Figure 4.12 Major export markets by quantity 
Norway mostly sells its salmon as whole 
slaughtered and gutted salmon with head, 
totalling over 80% of the salmon export. 
This is because there are prohibitively 
high taxes on imported processed fish-
products from Norway into the European 
Union.  There are clearly also other 
important markets comprising around 140 
countries around the world.  Around 10% 
of the salmon exports are in the form of 
fresh filets, and approximately 7% as 
frozen whole fish. Even though Norway  
(Figure from: NOU, 2019) 
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Figure 4.13 Historic value of major export markets 
has plenty of free trade agreements outside the European Union there seems to be limited 
enthusiasm to engage in large scale-trade 
with these partners. This is probably due to 
troubles with shipments being stopped for 
veterinarian controllers, or similar 
technical holdups. When we look at the 
most important importers of Norwegian 
salmon, graphed on the left, we see Poland 
as the biggest importer and  
Denmark as the third biggest. 
 
 
(Figure from: NOU, 2019) 
 These countries obviously do not have domestic markets able to consume salmon at these 






Figure 4.14 Mowi industrial locations  
 
(Figure from: Mowi 2019 Annual report) 
Mowi is the world’s largest salmon producing company in the world, by both volume and 
revenue.  Their products are available in around 70 countries round the world. In 2019 Mowi 
ended with a harvest of 435,904 tones (GWT), encompassing 19% of the total worldwide 
industry output.  
 
Mowi’s market dominance beaks down as follows; in Norway they harvest around one fifth in 
the nation’s total produce, in the United Kingdom they are responsible for around two fifths 
and in North America Mowi Group harvests over a third of the continents total harvest, see 
Figure 4.14.  
 
MOWIs’ is pretty much straight forward when it comes to their strategies. They intend to be 
the biggest and “the best” in every market. They are huge and expanding, the newer markets 
they have tried to gain dominance in has been Poland and France, two of the biggest 




Figure 4.15 Harvest volume MOWI per market 
 
(Figure from: Mowi 2019 Annual report) 
 
As far as investments into how they intend to meet future challenges in the market they seem 
to favour investment into automation and integration above all. I will comment further on this 
in chapter 5.4. But at the moment they are collaborating with Alphabet to improve underwater 
sensing and related technologies to be employed in further automating their salmon farms. 
 
SalMar 
SalMar is one of the biggest farmed salmon producers in the world. I will present a 
description of their business in later years, as one example of the strategies used by these 
mega-actors in the industry. The aim is to give some insight as to how these more, and more 
dominant firms in the industry operate, the strategies employed and to see what challenges 









Figure 4.16 SalMar export makets and revenue development since 2000 
(Figure from: SalMar 2019 Annual report) 
 
The markets supplied by SalMar, they are represented above  in Figure 4.15, as percentages of 
the total produce, sold to these markets in 2019. SalMar has a total of 100 licenses for salmon 
in Norway, each of which allows them a MTB (Norwegian acronym for maximum allowed 
biomass) normally ranging from 780 tons (in most of Norway)  to 945 tons (in northern parts 
on Norway). They are also involved in 12 additional concessions through partnerships and the 
like. In addition, SalMar operate 8 so-called development-licenses for 6240 tons, through 
their subsidiary Ocean Farming AS for the Ocean Farm 1 project/installation for open sea 
farming that slaughtered its first production cycle early in 2019. And was in the same year 
given a further 8 development-licenses through their majority owned company MariCulture 
AS for the Smart Fishfarm project/installation. Smart Fishfarm will have twice the capacity of 
Ocean Farm 1, so the size of these new development-licenses is not representative of the 
expected production of these new innovative expansions. These open-sea ventures 
consolidated under a new subsidiary SalMar Ocean AS, to manage them. 
These new open-ocean projects under are not the only development-licenses are not the only 
growth projects of 2019. SalMar increased its holdings of Arnarlax (Icelands biggest 
salmonfaming firm) from 42% to 59,4% in February, and SalMar also owns 50% of Scottish 
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Sea Farms Ltd. through its subsidiary Norskott Havbruk AS. Scottish Sea Farms is the second 
largest salmon-producer in Brittan. 
 
SalMar is not simply a farming company but is vertically integrated with the entire salmon 
value-chain. From smolt to farming to slaughter, processing-and-packaging, and sales. With 
manufacturing facilities at Frøya (InnovaMar), Aukra (Vikenco) and is building Northern-
Norway’s biggest processing plant InnovaNor in Senja, expected to open in 2021. There are 
also plans to build a hatchery in Tjuin to work with their existing hatchery in Follafoss in the 
region. In order to expand competitive competence in this crucial upstream activity. 
 
Lerøy seafood 
Figure 4.17 Product range by present sold Lerøy 2019 
 
Lerøy is one of the biggest general seafood 
companies in Norway. Naturally, that also 
means it is among the leading salmon-farmers 
on the world stage. As illustrated below, 
salmon and salmon-products make up over 
60% of the business. Lerøy delivers their 
products to over 80 markets around the world. 
Since Lerøy is a dominant firm in the industry 
based in Bergen Norway, I think it is a fitting 
example in order to gain insight into the 
leading strategies in the industry.  
(Figure from: Lerøy 2019 Annual report) 
 
Like all the other companies discussed Lerøy has totally integrated the entire value chain from 
roe production, to industrial processing, to product sales. They have production facilities, 
mostly salmon farms, all over Norway and in Scotland. This activity is, characteristically for 
the industry, organized in a myriad of firms like; Lerøy Aurora, Lerøy Midt og Lerøy Sjøtroll. 
In addition to this, Lerøy has factories and distribution centres in; Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 






Bakkafrost is the premiere salmon producer in the Faroe Islands. The company was listed 
mash 2010 on Oslo Børs. And is now on one of the biggest salmon farming companies on the 
stock market, valued at 36 128 120 000 Nokr at the time of writing. Bakkafrost produces a 
range of salmon products from; whole salmon, frozen salmon portions, salmon heads, 
backbones, belly flaps, and salmon skin. It is also involved in breeding, processing, sales and 
distribution of its products.  
 
There are a few other salmon farming companies on the Faroe Islands, but they are to small to 
be a good for comparatives with Bakkafrost. It makes more sense comparing it to the other 
big salmon farming companies listed on the Oslo Børs stock exchange like: Mowi, Lerøy 
Seafood and SalMar. They have all pretty much integrated all the value adding processes and 
produce their own fish food. As far as positioning Bakkafrost seems to have been satisfied 
with their position as the biggest salmon farmer in the Faroe Islands since they acquired 
Havsbrun in 2012 making them too big (owing 50% or more of the salmon licenses in the 
«country»). This forced them to sell down to 49%. They have seen good and steady growth 
ever since, but there is now very little room for Bakkafrost to expand into, the coastline is 
pretty much at capacity. This has probably prompted their recent move into Scotland. 
Bakkafrost has also had a special position after Russia invaded Crimea in 2014. In the 
aftermath of the invasion/annexation, Russia, in response to international sanctions and 
condemnation, instituted a ban on importing food from the US, the EU, Canada, Australia and 
Norway. Bakkafrosts’ location on the Faroe Islands gave them much less competition for the 
Russian market, something they capitalised on heavily. Bakkafrost plan going forward seems 
to be focused on continuing to buy their way into the Scottish market in order to increase its 







4.3 Development licences  
Development licences are a brand new state initiative by the Norwegian state to spur 
innovation and new growth in the salmon farming industry. They are basically especial 
dispensations for salmon farming projects in addition to the ordinary commercial licenses. In 
order to win these licences the projects has to be cutting edge, and directly challenging the 
limiting factors holding the industry grow back in a way that if successful will benefit not 
only the firm who initiated and runs the project, but the industry as a whole. At the time of 
writing the Directorate of Fisheries (Data from: Fiskeridirektoratet Date 08.31.2020) has 






















5 Analyses and discussion  
In section 5.1 I give a brief discussion of the global market for farmed salmon. Section 5.2 
contains an analysis of market concentration of suppliers in the salmon market. In section 5.3 
I discuss the firms’ strategies, while in 5.4 I look on the positioning the firms do in order to 
obtain development licenses. Finally, in section 5.5 I discuss the industry long term 
development in the light of the lifecycle model.  
 
5.1 The Global market 
Figure 5.1 The Global Salmon Market 
 
 
(Figure from: Mowi 2019 Annual report) 
Figure 5.1 shows the size of the different market supplies and demands in the world. We can 
see there are some key market areas where there are big differences between the two. Mainly 
Norway and Faeroe Islands as the biggest supplier in the world, and the European Union as 
having the biggest supply deficit of any market in the world. This supply deficit is about to 
get much worse for the European Union when The Unites Kingdom leaves taking Scotland, 
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the biggest salmon producing country in the union with it, out. This means that if there where 
to be a national debate regarding renegotiation with the European Union allowing 
manufacturing or processing of the Norwegian salmon exported to the Union, this would be 
the time. Especially since Merkels’ Germany, probably the most important political entity in 
the European Union, is in the process of abolishing the nations’ nuclear power program in 
favour of gas and coal-power, for some kind of environmental reasons best known to 
themselves. This has left Germany, as many other European states, more than ever before 
relying on Norwegian gas, strengthening the Norwegian negotiation position. There is also the 
fact that the biggest importer of Norwegian salmon is Poland, not because they eat that much 
salmon but, because this is one of a few industrial hubs for processing Norwegian salmon. 
With the political split between the Poland and the rest of the Union, particularly since the last 
election in Poland, see Table 5.1 below. The fact that there is so many workplaces dependent 
on the continuous supply of salmon from Norway, the European Union probably has good 
reasons not to exacerbate dissenting opinions from the Poles, which might happen if that 
supply was threatened. There are many smaller coastal towns in Norway who would 
appreciate some more industrial jobs of the sort prohibited by the EU tariffs. 
 
As general rule there is an incentive to transport the salmon as little as possible. Not only to 
limit transport costs but to avoid depreciate due to spoilage in transit. This means that  the 
American market, mostly supplies itself, and the European markets are supplied from the 
continent, the Oceania region is pretty much self-sufficient, and the Asian markets are spit 
between the major suppliers, with European/Norway supplying the bulk. But even though this 
is a general trend for the flow of salmon around the world with continents kind of separated, 
there is every reason to believe that the individual prices of salmon around the world are 
highly positively correlated. This is depicted below in Figure 5.2. And even though Norway is 
not the most important supplier in America the United States of America is still the fourth 







Tabel 5.1 20 biggest markets for norwegian salmon 2019-2020  
 
(Data from: Sjømatrådet Date 08.31.2020) 
 
  January - December 
2019 - Amount in tons 
and value in 1000 
NOKR 
  
Januar - mai 2020 -
Amount in tons and 
value in 1000 NOKR     
 Market Amount Value Market Amount Value 
TOTALT 1.280.315 72.378.379 TOTALT 479.196 29.198.966 
EU27 942.736 50.751.590 EU27 352.783 20.459.777 
Polen 179.783 9.203.900 Polen 70.243 3.753.437 
Frankrike 116.266 6.443.418 Frankrike 43.507 2.659.369 
Danmark 113.961 5.794.927 Danmark 41.878 2.290.637 
U S A 67.923 5.078.611 U S A 27.959 2.279.066 
Spania 81.936 4.519.031 Spania 32.429 1.947.289 
Nederland 76.086 4.163.203 Nederland 30.227 1.813.530 
Storbritannia 72.602 3.980.089 Storbritannia 29.803 1.770.371 
Italia 68.832 3.834.238 Italia 20.351 1.245.723 
Sverige 47.722 2.825.006 Tyskland 18.584 1.159.084 
Japan 43.154 2.809.620 Japan 16.596 1.111.052 
Tyskland 49.199 2.795.584 Sverige 17.556 1.061.939 
Litauen 46.524 2.400.521 Sør-Korea 13.751 948.35 
Sør-Korea 32.322 2.157.016 Litauen 14.751 843.974 
Finland 32.461 1.635.111 Finland 11.951 641.753 
Kina 26.154 1.598.653 Kina 10.533 638.431 
Israel 21.798 1.264.792 Israel 8.457 532.894 
Hong Kong 16.671 1.043.044 Hong Kong 6.428 423.209 
Thailand 17.367 1.016.611 Taiwan 5.838 375.016 
Belgia 14.054 857.159 Thailand 5.345 363.578 
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Figure 5.2 World salmon price covariance 
 
(Figure from: NOU 2019)  
Looking at the spot price index chart above there is a few things that seems obvious. Firstly, 
salmon prices in Oslo, Seattle and Miami are highly correlated. This is not unexpected if we 
assume salmon is a product sold on a global market. We see also that the prices within the 
United States not only match up better with each other, as they trade on more even terms, but 
are also lower. This is congruent with what we would expect based on the trade theory 
introduced in chapter 3 and the price data seen in chapter 4. We can also see that the price 
data set looks like a random walk with price-peaks in the exact years discussed in chapter 4.1. 
This is expected as the demand overall is increasing (see Tabel 4.1 & Figure 4.9), and supply 
growth is effectively capped at present levels and is expected to fall in years to come.  
 
Another major development potentially impacting Norway’s position as a salmon farming 
nation is the allegations and following investigations into alleged cartel collusion, 
anticompetitive practises, and price-fixing between the major Norwegian firms in the 
industry. There are now launched investigations into this first by the European Union in early 
February 2019 (see SeafoodSource 1, Date 31.08.2020) followed by the United States (see 
SeafoodSource 2, Date 31.08.2020)  who followed suite by November the same year. This 
situation has also given rise to a bunch of class action lawsuits most notable the Canadian suit 
for half a billion Canadian dollars, (see CBC, Date 31.08.2020) filed in January 2020. Not to 
make light of a possibly serious allegations, but this is not the first time the industry was 
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under this type of scrutiny. After the crash in the early 2000-nds there where similar 
allegations, not of keeping prices too high, but rather price dumping. Those did not go 
anywhere. And looking at which firms are mentioned in the European commission‘s 
allegations there are some strange omissions. They are investigating and have raided the 
Scottish installations of, among others, SalMar and Lerøy Seafood, but not the company 
Scottish Sea Farms. Scottish Sea Farms is owned by SalMar and Lerøy Seafood and would be 
a natural target for this sort of investigation, if there was some collusion between the two 
owners. There are other suspicious oversights also, but in general the investigation targets 
Norwegian firms exclusively, and does not care about other large European firms even if they 
are owned and controlled by the suspected colluders.  
 
We can see from the table 5.1 above, several Asiatic markets in the top 20, notably Japan, 
South-Korea, China and Hong Kong. These are the markets suppling the work to Norwegians 
as there are no prohibiting tariffs stopping trade of processed salmon-products to these 
countries. The Chinese market was just opened last year after all the political od trade 
restrictions China issued on Norway after the Nobel Peace-Price went to Liu Xiaobo in 2010. 
There has been much written about the Chinees salmon market in the years since the time it 
was closed in 2010. Of course the manner and reason for the market closing is going to attract 
attention. But some attention has somewhat inflated the relative importance of this market. 
 
As we can see form Table 5.1 China is the 15 biggest national market. And as I have indicated 
earlier, as it is not limited by EU tariffs, with regards to the types of salmon products, how 
processed the salmon we export can be. I think it is of extra interest from a Norwegian 
perspective, as this industry gives jobs and other positive ripple effects for the Norwegian 
national economy. The Chinese market is in many ways very reminiscent of the situation of 
the Russian market. They are both two of the biggest countries in the world, by any standard, 
and they are both difficult countries to have stable and foreseeable trade relations with. 
Norway has exported significant amounts of salmon to both markets, at one time or another. 
They are both BRIC counties, which carries some expectations of a developing national 
economic welfare, making them increasingly attractive markets to sell to, in general. This is 
due to the effect from the Engel elasticity described in chapter 2. Even though China comes in 
as number 15, makes the Chinese market significant, we can clearly see that there are more 
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important Asian markets, like Japan and South-Korea, both of which have higher standard of 
living, probably making them less susceptible to cross-price elasticity issues that might come 
from steadily rising salmon prices (see Tabel 4.1 & Figure 4.9). 
 
Just like the Chinese closed their markets in response to a preserved political slight, so did 
Russia, in response to the condemnation of their annexation/occupation of Crimea. I will just 
disregard the unsubstantiated Russian claims of finding dangerous chemicals in Norwegian 
salmon also sighted for not wishing to import Norwegian salmon. The fact of the matter is 
that if market access to Russia could be attained, this would probably be worth much more 
than the Chinese market. Looking at the historical data (see Figure 4.12). Russia was one of 
the biggest national markets, and with an impressive growth rate. But the biggest advantage of 
the Russian market would be having a big non-European Union market so close. This market 
could be supplied without airplanes, cutting logistic costs significantly. Access to Russia 
would also limit the Norwegian independence on the EU-markets. 
 
5.2 Market concentration 
As we saw in chapter 4.2 the concentration measurements for the Norwegian Salmon 
aquaculture market are C4 = 49,22, C8 = 63,22. For reference I have included Table 5.2 in 
order gauge whether the salmon farming industry is concentrated. Even these number are a 




Table 5.2 Concentration Ratios ni Selected Manufacturing Industries 
 
(Table from: Carlton & Perloff 2015 page 280) 
 
The best analogue for the salmon farming industry in, the table, might be the meat industry as 
it is also an industrial food producer with a relatively long production cycle. It is also an 
industry where marketing is not a major factor in competition between the market actors. As 
we see the salmon market is much more concentrated with, C4 49 > 35, and C8 63 > 48. And 
if we look at how the industry ranks overall, there are 6 industries out of the 14 listed that are 
more concentrated in both C4 and C8. From this I would extrapolate that the salmon farming 
industry is more concentrated than production industries in general. Another important thing 
to evaluate is what type industries ranked above the salmon farming industry, and the fact that 
they are all much older industries. So looking at the expected progression from the industry 
lifecycle point of view, they have had a longer time for market to conglomerate, in the same 




5.3 Firm strategies 
A good way of starting to evaluate firm strategies is to look at industry though Porters’ 5 
forces. It summarises the most important factors for strategies employed by market actors in 
the industry. 
 
Power of buyers: 
Salmon is an inherently homogenous product, and differentiation is quite difficult. There is 
really no way of differentiation in the salmon market. The only real example I could find in 
my research was from Bakkafrost. Bakkafrost has focused on delivering salmon of 6-7+ kg. 
Farming the salmon to this size, which is around 1-2 kilos heavier than the industry average. 
This practice might explain how they achieved a price, above average spot price ever since 
2010. This price premium indicates that they have managed to create some differentiation and 
additional value in their product. Bigger salmon is also harder produce. There is added risk in 
letting the fish continue growing for the added time necessary, and the production yield per 
unit food is reduced as the fish gets bigger. There is no real hindrance for a customer in 
changing suppliers, so buyers do have some potential negotiation power.  
 
Power of suppliers: 
The biggest expense for salmon farming-firms is often the feed for the salmon. So for firms 
who do not make their own, they can be at the mercy of suppliers and the changing market 
prices for the fish-feed they need. There has also been an ongoing problem producing 
sufficient quantities of fish feed for many years. I have not discussed this aspect of the 
industry, as it is kind of a sideshow to the main parts of the industry I discuss in this thesis. 
The important aspect of the feed industry is, as an example of how firms have vertically 
integrated this key input factor. Even though the importance of having a secured personal 
supply of fish-feed has been downplayed after the introduction of plant-based protein from for 
example soy, most major firms have integrated this into their value chains. Bakkafrost, as an 
example been producing their own fish-feed now since they acquired Havsbrúnhar in 2012. 
They do however buy roe on occasion, but there is a much larger international market for roe. 
There is however a trend among the major salmon farming firms, not to be reliant on outside 
suppliers for roe or other key inputs. The other way of gaining an advantage as a supplier, that 
is though having advantages position as a supplier is through international trade treaties. The 
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best example of this is Bakkafrost, as Faeroese supplier, they do have an inherent advantage 
in being able to supply the Russian market. 
 
Threat of entries 
If it is easy for new companies to establish themselves on the market, this is an obvious threat 
to the incumbents. However, when it comes to salmon-farming there are quite few suitable 
countries for production. The major salmon-farming countries Norway, Chile, Brittany, North 
America, New Zealand and Tasmania. This is because of the salmon is coldblooded and needs 
a very particular climate to flourish. In all the regions, the industry is active, the industry is 
strictly controlled though state laws and regulations. These state licenses are quite expensive 
(prohibitively so), one sanction in Norway on 2017 would cost 20-70 million NOK and there 
is no reason for those prices to have dropped. Not to mention the incentive of every 
incumbent firm to hinder new firms establishing themselves, and when factoring in fish-feed, 
production facilities and ships, needed to get started, it is safe to say that these big companies 
have no problem defending against new entries. It would be way to easy too keep new 
companies from entering the industry, this is exemplified by the lack of new entries. 
 
Substitutes 
There are of course other good edible proteins on the market. Salmon has always charged a 
premium compared to other popular choices like; chicken, beef, pork and even lamb. But 
prices are unpredictable, so nobody really knows. There is no direct substitute for salmon but 
it would be wrong not to think relative price changes plays a part in the purchasing process 





Figure 5.3 Rellative price differences indexed to salmonprice 
 
Source: Mowi (2019) Yearly report  
 
Competition in the industry 
Competition in the industry mainly revolves around two main points. Securing and expanding 
the individual each firms value-chain. This involves securing key input factors, as not too rely 
on an unstable market, probably run at the mercy of competitors. And securing good facilities 
for processing and sales of salmon products worldwide. The main thing driving interaction 
between the competitors is legislations limiting production and the limited amount of key 
input factors, namely fish feed.  
 
The large costs and demanding learning curve of establishing worldwide salmon processing 
factories and sales offices combined with the limited numbers of licenses for salmon 
aquaculture industry makes buying up smaller competitors the dominating strategy in the 
industry. This leads to ever fewer companies supplying a growing worldwide demand for 
salmon. As I discussed in chapter 2.6 and illustrated in Figure 2.1, the market incentives line 
up with the market trajectory, from somewhere in the light green area and towards the 
“bottom right red square”.  
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As I discussed, these market forms often do not have as much direct price competition and 
have higher than average returns. There are good reasons to believe that the salmon farming 
market operates similar to a Cournot model. But with the caveat that the overall market 
quantity is an external known variable for every market actor, as it the total aloud production 
from every salmon farming nation summed. And that the manner in which every company 
sets its production quantity, is a combination between buying licenses as they are up for sale, 
and buying each other in order to gain those licenses. We also know that the price of salmon 
in the market is largely explained by the volume or quantity of salmon in the market see 
Figure 4.9 for the regression and the above Table 4.1 where it is discussed. 
 
There is also no direct incentive for multiple companies to sell and compete on price in 
individual foreign distant markets. As it makes much more sense to sell to a national market 
not yet exploited heavily by competitors. This is supported by Asche, et.al. (2019) and is 
depicted in Figure 5.3 below. 
 
Figure 5.4 Distibution of firms over destinations 
 
(Figure: Asche, et.al. 2019) 
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If there is another model that might explain how the market for salmon works it would be the 
leader follower model. With MOWI as the leader, or if the allegations by the European Union 
(discussed in section 5.1) has merit a cabal of Norwegian salmon companies colluding, acting 
together as an industry leader, leaving the rest of the world to be the competitive fringe. There 
is undoubtedly an incentive to work together in such a way, however I don’t really see the 
credible threat needed to keep the individual firms from cheating. It is probably impossible to 
go into a protracted price war when the production quantity of salmon is set by 3rd parties. 
The first actor to lower prices would just sell out and miss out on profits. (See figure 2.2. for 
an example of cartel behaviour) 
 
5.4 Development licenses 
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(Data from: Fiskeridirektoratet Date 08.31.2020) 
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Above are the approved development licenses I could find for the companies I studied. 
Projects approved through development licenses are of three main types. Open ocean farming, 
land based farming or closed system farming.  
SalMar has already started up its first open ocean farm Ocean Farming 1 and seems to be 
satisfied with its first production run. So much so, in fact that they have already ordered up 
their next open ocean farm “Smart Fishfarm”. 
Lerøy Seafood is not jumping in with both feet just, but has gotten approval for a closed 
system project called “pipefarm”. But it has not been built yet. 
Mowi seems to be very underrepresented, when taking into account their size. They have two 
approved small closed system projects, but they do not look very serious about actually doing 
them. They were probably more excited about the giant project submitted under the name 
Aqua Storm (the biggest proposal ever sent for approval under a development licence). But 
this project was rejected outright, as it was essentially a standard salmon farm with more 
automated systems. 
 
81 Mowi AS 30.04.2019 






(Data from: Fiskeridirektoratet Date 08.31.2020) 
 
It is too soon to know what the impact of these project and the technologies will bring to the 
industry. But exiting thing are happening. And there is hope of growing substantially if this 









5.5 Industy livfecycle 
There is really no realistic way of increasing the output to match the ambition of the major 
suppliers, production or the market demand for salmon. At least not through conventional 
licences in the fjords, under the current regulations. What capacity any one costal-area or 
fjord has without adverse effects on the natural ecology is an evolving field of research. 
(Bergland et. al, 2020). The obvious facts are that salmon-farming like any other industry can 
get overcentralised, polluting the environment adversely impacting the local environment. 
There are many factors at play in determining the maximal sustainable productivity of any, 
one aria. This prompted a policy based on the precautional principle, limiting the growth of 
the industry. This is exemplified by lack of the relative lack of increase in salmon-licenses 
and therefore production slowed significantly around 2010 (Table 4.1). As we know the 
limited increase in production quantity did not stunt growth the overall industry (Figure 4.5). I 
do however believe this growth can be largely contributed to demand-side factors driving up 
demand, and supply was not keeping up with the growth-rate, this resulted in higher prices 
(See Table 4.1). 
 
After the explosive growth of the salmon market started to slow-down markedly around 2010, 
this trend has only intensified. Annual growth was at 8% annually since the mid-90’s but has 
dropped to 7% in the last decade. (MOWI 2019) Expectations are that this decline in just the 
beginning and projections are at a 3% annual growth to 2023. This is due to biological limits 
of salmon farming and increased regulations in order to limit the biological footprint of the 
industry.  
 
This stark slowing in the growth rates of the industry is typical for an industry in the shake-
out or maturity stages of the industry lifecycle. These stages are also typified by market 
consolidation. I think the main reason the salmon market has centralised so quickly is the fact 
that the industry demand was never truly satisfied, in a way that pushed prices significantly 
down towards marginal cost. The global demand for salmon is just too great. This greatly 
incentivises production expansion, normally there would come a point where marginal 
willingness to pay decreases, but in the case of salmon, it seems that the industry hit other 
restrictions before this effect became very evident. As the industry started to hit the 
restrictions to expand production by just building more farms, and even before this, it became 
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evident to all involved that the only way to keep growing as an individual firm was buying 
out the competition.  
 
This has resulting in the industry, if looked at like it is presented in Figure 4.5, with 
production quantity and value both resembling the classing industry lifecycle in Figure 2.3. 
Only the quantity peaking first, and in response to production quantity growth rates slowing 
as we saw in Table 4.1 the prices go up. Profits increase, and this makes it even easier for 
bigger firms to buy up the competition. 
The big question is what the potential of the new technologies being tested/developed though 
the new development licenses will do to the industry. There is the possibility of the industry 
hitting a new growth phase if these new methods poove reliable, eco-friendly, and profitable. 
What is not a given however is that these new methods will lour new entries to the market, 


















Since the 1960s until for some years ago, the demand for farmed salmon was growing, partly 
as a consequence of spreading salmon to new countries and partly as a consequence of an 
increase in average income as salmon is characterized as a luxury good. This means that there 
has been and still is a strong incentive for increasing production, either by new firms and 
production locations and new countries entering the market, or that existing firms increase 
their production capacity by taking up new locations. However, the restrictions following 
from increasing regulations regulating the industry and the instituting of production licenses 
from authorities due to environmental concerns, the limitation in the supply of suitable 
salmon feed and tariffs and other trade barriers, sometimes complemented by closure of trade 
due to conflicts between an export country and an import country,  has impeded production 
growth. These factors have all to some degree shaped and limited the growth of the salmon 
supply, resulting in insufficient growth to keep track with demand increases in the latest 
years. Hence, we have seen an increase in the prices of salmon worldwide, at least since 2014, 
although the prices are volatile due to seasonal fluctuations in demand.  
 
At the same time, a growth strategy for the existing firms will be to take control of other 
smaller operating firms. Again, this means that the number of operating firms decreases over 
time, and the average firm size increases. In addition, to the mergers and acquisitions going 
on, the regulatory tool development licenses has been introduced, in order to stimulate new 
and more environmental friendly production technologies into the industry. The competition 
to obtain development licenses seems further to stimulate strong and big sized firms, as the 
research and development costs connected to new and more efficient and environmentally 
friendly production technology might be enormous, and bring uncertainty into the firm. For 
instance, a firm winning a development license does not know the exact costs of developing 
the new production technology, it will be unknown what is the operating costs when 
implementing the new technology, it is unclear when the new technology can be introduced, 
and finally, the firm which has financed the research and development of this technology 
might see that a competitor gains the knowledge and equipment afterwards, having no extra 
research and development costs. Hence, becoming a large and dominant firm becomes even 
more advantageous as a consequence of economies of scale when new production technology 




Related to my research question a), this study indicates that the global salmon market can be 
dived into 3 continent markets; the European market, the Asian market and the American 
market, and that the supply to the American market is mainly from American locations, while 
the Asian and European markets are served by European producers. The position of Norway 
as a salmon producing market is strong, being the biggest supplier in the world. The two 
biggest problems with the position is lack of access the potentially very strategically 
important and valuable Russian market, and a trade-deal with the EU prohibiting processing 
of Norwegian salmon pre-export. 
 
 My research question b) was related to the firms’ actual strategies in the farmed salmon 
market. Here we have seen that even though there seems to be a growth in the demand for 
farmed salmon worldwide, the salmon farming industry’s possible increase in supply is 
limited due to national regulations, trade barriers and lack of salmon feed, implying that each 
operating firm is looking for other growth strategies. The competition going on in the industry 
seems like a Cournot oligopoly resulting in relatively high profit margins. For instance, 
mergers and acquisitions is seen to be the dominating strategy in the market, as the strongest 
firms try to seize market shares and better their market positions. Another example of how 
this limited numbers of operating firms compete, is found by studying their positioning 
regarding obtaining possible development licenses which seems to be one of few ways to 
increase production in the future.   
 
As I already has commented on in the introduction, the salmon aquaculture industry is 
affected by many factors and events, for instance trade policies, trade unions and treaties, 
environmental issues and policies, supply of necessary inputs (salmon feed), production 
technologies, ecological and biological conditions, and general and industry specific public 
regulations (taxes and licences). All such factors affect the actual competition going on, but 
the different factors actual influence on competition need to be further elaborated in studies to 
come. Such future studies, based on either primary or secondary data concerning the salmon 
farming industry, might widen and nuance our understanding of the national position of 
Norway as a aquaculture country, the industrial structure of the industry and the strategies the 
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